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THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME ... UNTIL YOU
DISCOVER DEFECTS: DO PRELITIGATION
STATUTES RELATING TO CONSTRUCTION
DEFECT CASES REALLY PROTECT THE NEEDS
OF HOMEOWNERS AND DEVELOPERS?
Melissa C. Tronquet*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether a person owns a starter home or a multi-million
dollar mansion, discovering a construction defect in that
house can be a traumatic experience.' In the last two decades, residential construction defect litigation throughout the
United States has increased dramatically.! While the flood of
litigation in the construction defect arena has kept lawyers
busy, these cases have burdened developers, builders, and in* Senior Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44; J.D.
Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; Bachelor of Urban & Environmental Planning, University of Virginia. I would like to thank my dad, Michael Tronquet, for his suggestions, encouragement, editing, and guidance.
1. For a detailed description of one case of severe construction defects, see
Diane Wedner, Newly Built, But Not Worry Free--As Home Buyers and Builders Square Off in Court Over Alleged Construction Defects, One Thing Is Certain: The Trend Has Meant a Drop in Affordable Housing,L.A. TIMES, May 12,
2002, at K1. In this article, Wedner describes the story of a young couple who
found holes in the walls of their "dream home." They eventually learned that
the holes were made by a species of beetle able to bore through both wood and
metal, whose eggs can survive for years and resist extermination, discovered
that neighbors had similar holes, and determined that most of the new homes in
the neighborhood were constructed with infested wood. The builder offered to
fill the holes, but this solution was unsatisfactory, so the neighborhood owners
sued the builder. Id.
2. See Roger Dunstan & Jennifer Swenson, ConstructionDefect Litigation
and the Condominium Market, 6 CRB NOTE 1, at 1 (Nov. 1999), at
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/99/notes/v6n7.pdf; see also Michael M. Edwards et
al., A Defense Perspective to Construction Defect Litigation and the Upcoming
Legislative Session: Where It Has Been and Where It May Possibly Go, NEV.
LAWYER, Jan. 2001 (discussing an informal survey of construction defect actions
in Nevada and noting that 1999 filings increased 442% over filings in 1998).
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surers, and the impact of such cases has been particularly
pronounced in California.3 The economic impact on builders,
developers, and insurers receives the most notoriety of all the
problems relating to construction defect litigation. In response to the large numbers of claims and the high cost of defending construction defect lawsuits,5 insurers have either
drastically limited the coverage they offer or withdrawn altogether from insuring new residential construction projects.'
This trend has been particularly pronounced in the condominium market.7 Faced with soaring rates or no insurance
at all, condominium developers either pass on the high insurance costs to buyers or simply elect not to build new housing
projects.' These problems have led to a void in the condominium market that threatens the availability of affordable housing.9 The large expenditure of both money and time required
to bring a construction defect lawsuit is similarly burdensome
3. See, e.g., Kelly Zito, InsuranceNightmare-FloodofLawsuits Alleging
Defective Construction Leaves Builders Scrambling to Find Coverage For New
Projects, S.F. CHRON., July 11, 2002, at B1; Robert Gavin, Regional Report:
Home Builders Face Insurance Woes: Coverage Scarce, Premiums High After
an Increasein ConstructionSuits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B7.
4. See, e.g., David M. Golden, Class Action Suits ThreateningHomebuilders, 36 BUS. INS. 25, June 24, 2002, at 10.
5. Courts have established that insurers of development projects have a
duty to defend builders in construction defect lawsuits. See Montrose Chemical
Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1995); Wendy A. Gable, Note, Constructinga Solution to California ' ConstructionDefect Problem, 30 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 299 (1999).
6. A large quantity of condominium housing produced in the 1980s created
a sizeable pool of plaintiffs alleging condominium defects. See CYNTHIA KROLL
ET AL., CAL. POLY RES. CENTER, DETAILED RESEARCH FINDINGS: THE IMPACT OF
CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIGATION ON CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT (2002), at
http://www.ucop.edu/crpc/condorpt.pdf:
In interviews, builders and-insurers consistently report that California
is more prone to construction-defect litigation relating to condominiums
and attached housing units than other states, and that the plaintifffriendly characteristics of California's legal environment tend to encourage greater numbers of such lawsuits, thereby reducing the number of such units being built.
Id. at 17.
7. There are some astounding statistics about changes insurers have made
in response to the flood of construction defect litigation. See, e.g., Gavin, supra
note 3 ("IN]ear San Diego, there were 20 to 30 insurers in the late 1980s; now
there are no more than four .... 17 insurers have pulled out of the state [of
Washington] over the past year.").
8. See Mike Allen, Building Industry Faces Skyrocketing Insurance Premiums, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at 13; Gavin, supranote 3.
9. See, e.g., Golden, supranote 4; Wedner, supra note 1.
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to owners of single family homes. Courts faced with managing these cases are encumbered by the significant amount of
time they demand from the judicial system.
In response to the burdens imposed on all parties, courts
and states began developing policies to help mitigate the
negative impacts of residential construction defect litigation.'1
Courts in many states have limited tort recovery for economic
losses related to residential construction defects." At the
forefront addressing problems associated with construction
defect litigation, the California legislature has created statutes requiring pre-claim compliance with mandatory dispute
resolution procedures. 2 The concepts behind these "prelitigation" statutes have inspired other states to address residential construction defects with similar types of statutes. 13 This
comment analyzes whether prelitigation requirements encouraging early resolution of residential construction defect
claims can meet the needs of homeowners, developers and
builders, insurers, and states.
First, this comment examines traditional legal theories
on which construction defect cases may be based, 4 highlighting recent case law developments in California. 5 Next, it outlines problems that construction defect litigation creates for
developers, builders, purchasers, and insurers of new homes 0
and reviews two California statutes that require parties involved in construction defect claims to complete specific prelitigation steps before filing formal action.'
Finally, the
comment analyzes the efficacy of those prelitigation 8 re10. See Emmet Pierce, Construction-DefectLitigationIs FirstStep for More
Housing,S.D. UNION TRIB., Sept. 29, 2002, at I1; Lew Sichelman, New Legislation May Ease Housing Crisis,L.A. TIMEs, July 7, 2002, at K4.
11. See, e.g., Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000).
12. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-20801 to 13-20-804 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 40.600 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46:3B-1 to 46:3B-20 (West 2002).
13. See Kenneth R. Harney, New Approach Seeks to Crimp Builder Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 2002, at C2 (noting that the National Association of

Home Builders is urging all states to consider enacting prelitigation statutes for
construction defect claims).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. See infra Part III. One statute establishes guidelines for claims of defects in condominium housing, and the other applies specifically to defects in
single family residential construction.
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quirements and suggests ways for California to improve and
adapt the prelitigation process for construction defect claims
to more effectively encourage early settlement or other resolution of those claims. 9

II.BACKGROUND
A.

Theories ofLiabilityin ConstructionDefect Cases

Construction defect litigation developed in the last halfcentury as a result of changes in the character of real estate
Today, homebuyers have several legal remedies
sales.20
available to compensate them for construction defects."' The
theories of liability available to a party alleging construction
defects will depend on the circumstances of the claim, and the
theories a party chooses can determine both the existence of
defects and the extent of recovery allowed for those defects.22
This section describes the most common theories of liability in
construction defect actions and their recent treatment by
California courts. 2
1.

Contract:Express Warranty

Under the theory of express warranty, a homeowner may
hold a developer or builder liable based on representations
made about the quality of a product. 2' Either words or actions
may create an express warranty, 25 and claims of express warranty are commonly based on contract warranties with re-

19. See infra Part IV (discussing ways in which the prelitigation process for
condominium defect cases could be improved in California).
20. See Joel B. Castro, Aas v. Hicks: The Battle Begins, in CONSTRUCTION
DEFECTS LITIGATION: HOT TOPICS 2001 99, 101 (Continuing Educ. of the Cal.
Bar, 2001); SAN DIEGO AsS'N OF GOV'TS, CONDOMINIUM CONSTRUCTION DEFECT
LITIGATION AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: THE ANATOMY OF A PROBLEM, WITH
STRATEGIES FOR A SOLUTION 2 (July 2001) [hereinafter SAN DIEGO ASS'N], a vail-

able at http://www.sandag.org/uploads/publicationid/publicationid_146_576.pdf.
21. See Dunstan & Swenson, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that "[i]n both California and the nation, construction defect law has, to a great extent, been created as a result ofjudicial decisions. . ").
22. See JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND
DISPUTES § 8.1 (2001).
23. See infra Part II.A.(1)-(4) (outlining four common theories of liability
used in construction defect cases).
24. Castro, supra note 20, at 109.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (7th ed. 1999).
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spect to the performance of work or on warranties provided by
manufacturers.20
Warranty claims can be difficult to apply in the context of
construction defect claims because a construction contract is
not generally viewed as a contract for the sale of goods.27
However, some courts have allowed home buyers to sue
builders for breach of contract when products included in the
sales contract fail to meet express manufacturer warranties.28
In such cases, buyers may sue manufacturers for breach of
express warranties 29 and may also be able to sue builders who
fail to honor warranties for products that were included in a
sales contract.3 °
2.

Contract:Implied Warranty

Until the 1960s, real estate sales were characterized by
the principal of caveat emptor-"let the buyer beware.""'
Generally, this theory insulated sellers from liability because
it placed the burden of ensuring quality on the buyer.32 However, the dramatic increase in housing construction following
World War I13 led to both a change in attitude toward
buyer/seller relationships' and, unfortunately, a decline in
26. See id.; see also Castro, supra note 20, at 119.
27. See Castro, supra note 20, at 119.
28. See Presiding Bishop v. Cavanaugh, 32 Cal. Rptr. 144, 156-57 (1963)
(holding that manufacturer's express warranty to a contractor applied to the
owner of a building for whom the contractor was working because the purpose of
the warranty was to encourage consumers to ask their contractors to use the
manufacturer product).
29. See Herman v. Bonanza Bldgs., 390 N.W.2d 536 (Neb. 1986) (holding
that a manufacturer brochure purporting to replace or repair defect, when given
to an owner, created an express warranty for which the manufacturer could be
held liable).
30. See id.
31. See SAN DIEGO ASSN, supra note 20, at 2; Castro, supra note 20, at 100
("For three centuries, the "maxim" of caveat emptor insulated the home seller
from liability for construction defects.").
32. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 2 (observing that real estate
transactions in the caveat emptor era were generally entered into by parties
who knew one another, in contrast to buyers and sellers in recent decades who
usually know little about each other).
33. See Castro, supra note 20, at 101 ("Before 1945 new construction was
estimated at $2 billion annually. In 1945 new housing starts jumped to $15 billion annually and increased to $18 billion by 1950.").
34. See SAN DIEGO AS'N, supra note 20, at 2 ("The common law rule of caveat emptor originated in an environment of repeat transactions between buyers and sellers who knew one another. Modern markets, however, usually involve buyers and sellers who have limited information about one another and
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the quality of new homes. 5 As a result, purchasers of defective homes turned to the courts for relief, and the caveat emptor rule was gradually abrogated.36
With the rejection of the caveat emptor doctrine, courts
began to recognize breach of implied warranty as a valid
claim in construction defect cases." The concept of implied
warranty originated from the Uniform Commercial Code "sale
of goods" rules38 and involves two policy rationales: (1) buyers
rely on the skill of the builder and are not in a position to
adequately inspect the construction; and (2) builders have
some duty to produce habitable housing and are likely better
positioned than buyers to bear economic losses.39 Because
those UCC provisions deal with sales of goods and not real
property, the UCC concepts of implied warranty apply to construction cases only by analogy."
The warranties of "fitness for intended purpose" and
"reasonably workmanlike construction" apply most commonly
in construction defect cases. 4' The implied warranty doctrine
benefits plaintiffs because warranties are based on expectations or reliance on builder work; therefore, recovery does not
necessarily require a showing of physical property damage.4 2
However, the implied warranty doctrine is limited in conlittle chance of repeat interaction.").
35. See Castro, supra note 20, at 101 (observing that poor quality and defects were inevitable results of the huge quantities of new housing being produced in such a short time).
36. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 2; Castro, supra note 20, at 101
(citing the Colorado case of Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (Colo.
1964) as the first case to reject caveat emptor, and noting that "since Carpenter,
an avalanche of appellate decisions throughout the nation have rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor...").
37. See Castro, supra note 20, at 102.
38. See id.
39. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d 88 (Cal. 1974) (applying
implied warranty theory to design and construction of apartment buildings);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1964) (holding that a builder
should be liable for burn injuries caused by improper installation of a hot water

valve because the buyer relied on the skill of the builder in presuming that the
house would be "reasonably fit for habitation"); Kuitems v. Covell, 231 P.2d 552
(Cal. 1951) (holding that a contractor could be liable for improper installation of
a roof because there is a good-faith duty to perform contractual obligations with

reasonable skill).
40. See Castro, supra note 20, at 105; ACRET, supra note 22, § 8.23; see also

Pollard,525 P.2d 88.
41. See ACRET, supranote 22, § 8.24-.25.
42. See, e.g., Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761
(2001).
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struction defect claims. 3 Plaintiffs must give builders reasonable notice of a defect," and file claims within time periods
required by statutes of limitations. 5 In some jurisdictions,
plaintiffs may only apply the doctrine of implied warranty in
cases involving new construction."
3.

Tort.-Negligence

Until recently, plaintiffs often included negligence as a
cause of action in construction defect cases, alleging that
home builders have certain duties of care to home buyers. 7
In construction defect cases involving negligence claims,
plaintiffs must establish the basic elements of the tort: duty,
breach of duty, causation, and harm.4 '8 The most contentious
element of negligence claims for construction defects is often
the extent of harm necessary for recovery because it can be

43. See id. at 773 (suggesting that plaintiffs must show that claimed defects
are inherent and "substantially certain" to malfunction).
44. See Pollard,525 P.2d at 90.
45. Statutes of limitation for construction defects can be fairly complicated.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 2000). This statute offers no definitions of construction defects, but distinguishes between "patent" and "latent"
defects. Patent defects are apparent or easily discoverable, and there is a four
year statute of limitations for such defects. Id. § 337.1. Latent defects are not
visible or easily discoverable, and there is a ten year statute of limitations for
these defects. Id. § 337.15. California also has a ten year statute of repose specifically for construction defects, which applies to latent defects. Id. Unlike
statutes of limitations, which run from the time the injury is discovered, statutes of repose run from the time of substantial completion of a structure. For a
discussion of California's statutes of limitation and repose and a comparison to
such statutes in other states, see KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 19-2 1.
46. See E. Hilton Drive Homeowners Ass'n v. W. Real Estate Exch., 186 Cal.
Rptr. 267 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs could not use a theory of implied warranty when they purchased their homes from a vendor who purchased them
four years prior to selling them to plaintiffs); see also Castro, supra note 20, at
107-08 (discussing the fact that the definition of "new construction" is not settled, and the viability of the implied warranty defense in such cases will often
depend on the positions of the parties involved).
47. See, e.g., Sumitomo Bank v. Taurus Developers, 229 Cal. Rptr. 719
(1986) (holding builder responsible for "reasonable care" toward purchasers);
Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1983) (holding engineer liable for
faulty repair of a landslide); Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976) (holding
architect liable for defective design of condominiums); Connor v. Great W. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1968) (holding construction lender extensively
involved in project liable to homebuyers for negligent construction); Stewart v.
Cox, 362 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1961) (holding subcontractor liable to homeowner for
faulty work on a swimming pool).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
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difficult to define the "harm" that poor construction causes."
A defect can substantially reduce the value of a home without
causing actual physical damage."0 Builders argue that even if
a defect violates construction standards, no real harm occurs
if the defect has not caused physical damage or injury. 5'
From a homeowner's perspective, however, defects can cause
harm by creating physical damage that will require repair,
and potentially reducing the value of the home.52
Several states limit negligence liability for defects that
have not caused tangible harm.53 Known as the "economic
loss rule," this principle bars tort recovery in cases where a
defect has not caused physical damage to the property or actual injury.54 In jurisdictions that apply the economic loss
rule, plaintiffs suffering solely from negative economic impacts of faulty construction cannot recover for negligence. 5
49. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 3-4.
50. See id. (observing that any defect "reduces the value of the structure;
and clearly, it seems absolutely necessary to repair it. But in the law of tort,
something that is merely defective, but has not caused physical harm to people
or property, has only caused 'economic damage,' which is not true damage in the
tort sense").
51. See Wedner, supra note 1 (noting a common belief held by builders that
owners often include claims for "frivolous" defects because lawyers convince
them to include those defects, not because those owners are truly concerned
about potential damage).
52. See id. (giving examples of construction defects that cause physical
damage, physical injury, and economic harm, and noting that all defects are potentially harmful from the homeowner perspective).
53. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 20.
54. See Alan C. Eagle & Frank J Giliberti, Economic Loss Rule Limits
Plaintiff's Ability to Recover Damages, 1 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: CONSTRUCTION
DEFECTS 11 (Dec. 2000). The authors discuss negligence claims in construction
defect cases:
A lawsuit over alleged construction defects may assert... claims for
negligence that contend that the plaintiffs suffered property damage,
property damage and economic loss, or economic loss alone. It is generally well accepted that a defendant that negligently injures a plaintiff
may be liable for all proximately caused harm, including economic
losses. However, a virtually per se rule in courts across the country,
known as the economic loss rule, bars recovery for economic loss unless
the negligent conduct also caused physical harm.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 20 (reporting that twelve of
twenty-one states surveyed in a construction defect litigation study apply the
economic loss doctrine, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New
York, and New Jersey).
See generally AM. B. ASS'N COMMITTEE ON
CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIG., STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC
Loss DOCTRINE IN CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: A REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DAMAGES AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE SURVEY OF STATE LAWS
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Homeowners argue that this rule excuses careless builders
from responsibility for repair of potentially serious defects."
Builders, however, support application of the rule and argue
that it reduces "frivolous" claims for defects that may never
cause damage.
4.

Tort: Strict Liability

Strict liability allows plaintiffs to hold manufacturers responsible for damage caused by products regardless of fault,
so that plaintiffs need not prove that a manufacturer violated
the standard of reasonable care.5" Like product manufacturers, housing developers and designers are in a better position
to assume the risk of loss than home buyers." When strict liability is applied in construction defect actions, courts generally limit it to cases involving mass-produced or multiple-unit
housing. 6'
A. Recent Judicial Treatment of Theories ofLiability in
California
1. Limits on Tort Recovery for Defects. Aas v. Superior
Court
In the 2000 case of Aas v. Superior Court,6 the California
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (1996).
56. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 4 (noting homeowner concern
that "builders will become careless with the building code, or that serious defects such as missing firewalls between bedrooms and fireplaces will go unfixed").
57. See id (observing that builders support the economic loss rule because
their main concern is suits over "frivolous" defects in which damage is very
speculative).
58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 926.
59. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 22 and tbl. 2 (summarizing data that
shows five of twenty-one states surveyed-California, District of Columbia, New
Jersey, Nevada, and Pennsylvania-apply strict liability in construction defect
cases). For an explanation of strict liability in California construction cases, see
ACRET, supra note 22, at § 8.32-.59.
60. See, e.g., Del Mar Beach Club Owner's Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting,
176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981) (applying strict liability to developer of a common interest development when all purchasers relied on builder skill); Kriegler v.
Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (applying strict liability to developer based on the rationale that there was no significant difference between
mass-produced products and mass-produced housing).
61. Aas, 12 P.3d 1125, overruled by statute as stated in Rosen v. State Farm
Gen. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351 (Cal. 2003). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (West
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Supreme Court upheld the economic loss rule in California,
limiting tort claims in construction defect cases to defects
that had already caused physical damage.62
In Aas, homeowners sued the developer and general contractor for negligence, strict liability, breach of contract, and
breach of implied and express warranty.63 The plaintiffs
sought damages for the cost of repairing the defects as well as
damages for diminution in the value of their homes.6 With
respect to the negligence claim, the trial court granted the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the defects
that had not caused
The court of appeals
66 property damage.'
upheld this ruling.
The court held that without property damage or physical
injury, the plaintiffs in Aas could not recover in negligence for
economic losses alone.67 After analyzing the different theories
of tort liability and their application to construction defect
claims, the court concluded that actions for defects that have
not yet caused damage are more appropriate for the field of
contract law.68 Finally, the court applied the economic loss
rule to bar negligence claims for defects that had not caused
damage. 9
Chief Justice George agreed with the majority that "minor defects"7 ° which do not create sufficient risk of injury or
damage to property should not be included in negligence ac2004).

62. Id. at 1130.
63. Id. at 1128.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1129.
66. Id
67. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1130.
68. The court noted,
Speaking very generally, tort law provides a remedy for construction
defects that cause property damage or personal injury. Focusing on the
conduct of persons involved in the constructions process, courts in this
state have found such a remedy in the law of negligence. Viewing the
home as a product, courts have also found a tort remedy in strict products liability ....Any construction defect can diminish the value of a

house. But the difference between price paid and value received, and
deviations from standards of quality that have not resulted in property
damage or personal injury, are primarily the domain of contract and
warranty law or the law of fraud, rather than of negligence.
Id. at 1130.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1138 (citing "doors that are out of plumb, discolored drain stoppers, and inoperable garbage disposals" as examples of such "minor" defects).
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tions.7' But the Chief Justice also dissented, arguing that
some serious defects pose significant potential risks,"2 and
that a homeowner should be allowed to maintain a negligence
action for serious defects even when they have not manifested
damage." Although the Chief Justice argued that the distinction between major and minor defects appealed to common
sense and sound economic policy,74 the majority thought that
it would be an unworkable distinction in practice.75
Developers and builders praised the Aas decision as a
positive step in the direction of limiting frivolous construction
defect claims." However, home buyers, their attorneys, and
some legislators criticized the decision as an inappropriate solution to the problems of excessive construction defect litigation.7 7 The Aas decision helped clarify California's perspective
on economic loss and negligence claims," but did not address
the extent of damage required for recovery under other theories of liability in construction defect actions 9

71. Id. at 1143.
72. Id. (citing improperly constructed walls that would create risks of collapse in earthquakes or high winds, or that would allow a fire to spread rapidly
as examples of serious defects).
73. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1143 (arguing that allowing negligence recovery "would
not require [the court] to break new ground.... [and] also best comports with
rational economic policy, as well as common sense").
74. Id. ("It obviously is preferable to pay a relatively few dollars at an early
date to correct a serious safety risk that may cost millions or billions of dollars
to redress if the inhabitants are forced to wait for disaster to strike and for
death, personal injury, or physical property damage to ensue.").
75. Id. at 1140-41. The author noted that "the proposal entails serious
difficulties....
The distinction between serious and minor defects has a
superficial theoretical appeal that evaporates in practice" because it would force
courts and experts to speculate on the "potential seriousness of possible
property damage" and that such speculation would "insulate from demurrer and
summary judgment virtually all complaints containing allegations of building
code violations." Id.
76. See Cynthia A. R. Woollacott, In the Land of Aas: The California Supreme Court has Ruled that Damages from ConstructionDefects Must be Manifest in Order to Bring a Tort Cause ofAction, 24 L.A. LAWYER 35 Jan. 2002.
77. See id. at 35-36 (noting that even though Aas was considered a "victory"
for builder/defendants, plaintiffs and defendants in defect cases may still have
several effective claims). Courts in other states have also applied the economic
loss doctrine to construction defect claims; see also Calloway v. City of Reno,
993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 2000).
78. Aas, 12 P.3d 1125.
79. See Woollacott, supra note 76, at 42 (observing that "whether contract
related damages constitute property damage under insurance policies might be
the next subject of appellate scrutiny").
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2.

Express and Implied Warrantyas Alternatives to
Tort Recovery
The Aas ruling was only a partial victory for developers
and builders in limiting defect claims." Although the decision
foreclosed negligence recovery for purely economic losses, the
Aas court noted explicitly that it did not preclude recovery
under theories of contract or warranty.8' In the 2001 case of
Hicks v. Kaufman & BroadHomes Corp.,8 2 the California Supreme Court allowed recovery under an implied warranty
theory for defects that had not yet caused damage, and cited
Aas as support. 3
Homeowners in Hicks sued the developer for the cost of
replacing defective concrete slabs that had not yet displayed
damage.' The court allowed the plaintiffs to use theories of
breach of express and implied warranty to recover for defects
that had not manifested physical damage by proving that the
slabs contained "an inherent defect which is substantially
certain to result in malfunction during the useful life of the
product."8 The court held that the product's defect was
enough for recovery, reasoning that the plaintiffs had a right
under warranty to a product free of defects.86 The remedy
was the cost of replacing the defective slabs.87
Although Hicks primarily addressed the right to recover
for defects in the context of class action certification, the decision is important because it also reveals the court's view that
actual physical damage from defects is not a condition prece-

80. Id. at 36 (speculating that "shifts in construction defect litigation may be
less substantive than people hoped or feared").
81. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1130 ("Nor, finally, does the ruling prevent plaintiffs
from introducing any evidence relevant to their claims for breach of contract or
warranty, assuming those claims survive to trial, even if that evidence has been
excluded for the purposes of plaintiff's tort claims."); see also Castro, supra note
20, at 100 (commenting that "plaintiffs should dust off common law and statutory warranty theories, because they may be the only viable option to recover for
construction defects that have not caused property damage").
82. Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761 (2001).
83. Id. at 770 ("[T]he Supreme Court's discussion [in Aas] of the differences
in damages recoverable in negligence versus breach of warranty clearly suggests the court would have upheld the trial court's ruling with respect to the
breach of warranty causes of action.").
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id. at 767-68.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 773.
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dent to recovery." While the terms "inherent defect" and
"substantially certain to malfunction" can be debated in future cases, Hicks preserves a plaintiffs right to recover for defects that have not caused damage.89
C New Home Construction and ConstructionDefect
Litigation
The condominium market has absorbed many of the effects of construction defect litigation.0 In the 1980s, condominiums became popular among developers and homebuyers
because they were more affordable to construct and purchase
than single family homes.9 1 Often, builders could not find
enough skilled construction workers to complete the large
numbers of projects." Shoddy construction resulted and, consequently, unhappy homebuyers.93
Single family homeowners also sue over construction defects, but cases involving condominium and common interest
development projects have probably received greater attention because condominium defects are frequently more pronounced.94 Lawsuits by condominium homeowner associations often require more money, resources, and effort than
suits by single family residence homeowners.99 Particularly
88. Id. (stating "we see no reason why a homeowner should have to wait for
the inevitable injuries to occur before recovering damages to repair the defect
and prevent the injuries from occurring").
89. Hicks, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761.
90. See, e.g., Dunstan & Swenson, supranote 2, at 1 (stating that "construction defect litigation has been blamed for destroying the condominium market");
SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that "the surge of condominium
construction defect litigation in the last 20 years has significantly reduced condominium construction").
91. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 4-5 (describing how a thriving
economy led to an increase in residential construction, how both experienced
and inexperienced builders could easily obtain loans, and how projects were frequently constructed by unskilled workers); see also Dunstan & Swenson, supra
note 2, at 1-3 (describing the builder-friendly real estate market of the 1980s).
92. See, e.g., Dunstan & Swenson, supra note 2, at 1-2 (presenting a graph
of multi-family permit data from 1980-1999; while multi-family permits include
apartments and condominiums, the graph shows a major increase in multifamily projects in the 1980s, followed by a sharp decline in the 1990s).
93. See id. at 1.
94. See, e.g., Kenneth Harney, New Dispute-Resolution Law Helps Avoid
Suing the Builder, BALTIMORE SUN, June 23, 2002, at IL; see also Wedner, supra note 1.
95. Condominium owners have a larger resource pool than single family
homeowners and therefore have more leverage in making defect claims. In
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in large condominium defect cases, claims by homeowner associations utilizing multiple theories of liability can lead to96
enormous costs for developers who must defend the claims.
Builders argue that both condominium and single family
homeowners exacerbate defect actions when they include
claims for defects that have little or no impact on the structure or the homeowner. 9 Homeowners and their attorneys
point out that litigation is an important measure for preserving homeowners' rights against defects in poorly constructed
homes.98 Homeowners simply want problems fixed, and litigation is often a "last resort" to which discouraged owners
turn when builders or developers fail to respond adequately.99
The full effect of construction defect litigation is difficult
to quantify because many other factors influence the housing
market.'0 0 In response to the flood of defect lawsuits in the
1990s, insurers began to increase premiums for builders of
condominium developments, 0 ' or refuse to insure condominCalifornia, the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act gives homeowner associations the right to make claims on behalf of all owners in their
communities. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1350-76 (2004). In addition, owners in common
interest developments are well-positioned to file class action claims. See Dunstan & Swenson, supra note 2, at 1, 5; see also SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20,
at 3 (noting that condominium associations not only have more resources to sue
than individual homeowners, but also have a fiduciary duty to investigate and
correct certain construction problems).
96. See Wedner, supra note 1 (citing examples of cases in which plaintiffs
complained of fairly minor defects that builders finally settled for amounts far
exceeding the cost of the actual problem).
97. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 10; Wedner, supranote 1; Zito, supra note 3.
98. See Pierce, supra note 10 (quoting a consumer-advocate who claims that
"if builders responded promptly to requests for repairs, the defects wouldn't
mushroom into the larger problems that force frustrated homeowners into lawsuits").
99. See id. That construction defect cases are commonly taken on a contingent fee basis is an additional factor that also might explain they go to trial so
often.
100. For a full explanation of factors impacting research on construction defect litigation and the condominium market, see Dunstan & Swenson, supra
note 2. See also KROLL ET AL., supra note 6. These authors observe that data
collection for both condominium construction, and the multitude of other factors
influencing the condominium market, are inadequate to formulate conclusive
observations about the exact impact of defect litigation on condominium development.
101. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1995) (holding insurer responsible for any potential liability for continuous and
progressive damages when insurer had a policy in effect during the period of
damage). For full analysis of insurer indemnity and construction defect claims,
see Gable, supra note 5.
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ium developments altogether."2 Coupled with the risk of lawsuits, the increased cost of insurance discouraged developers
from constructing new condominium projects."0 The lack of
condominium construction has seriously impacted the housing market-most notably the affordable housing market. 0 4
Theorizing that builders who face less defect litigation
will be more able and willing to apply their time and resources to new construction, and that homeowners will stop
turning to the courts if they have a greater opportunity to get
defects fixed, state legislatures have targeted statutory reform as one way to combat the problems of construction defect
litigation. 5 Therefore, legislatures have begun to formulate
statutes designed to encourage negotiation and promote settlement before homeowners file defect actions. 016
D. The California "CalderonProcess"for Common Interest
Developments
In 1995, the California legislature added section 1375 to
the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act. 107
Known as the "Calderon Process, " 1 ' this law established a detailed set of requirements for homeowners' associations to fulfill before proceeding with formal defect claims against builders. 10 9 Section 1375 is limited to cases involving common
102. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 20, at 6 (citing a California Research
Bureau study that concluded that the number of insurers for condominium projects in California declined from more than 40 in the 1980s, to less than 3 today); see also Zito, supra note 3 (citing California construction insurance data
stating "for every $1 insurers collected in 1998, they paid out nearly $1.87; in
2000, insurers paid out about $2.95 for every dollar in premiums").
103. See Jesus Sanchez, Ruling by Court Unlikely to Spur Condo Constructions Housing Despite New Limits on Negligence Lawsuits, CaliforniaBuilders
Still FaceHigh Cost ofDefect Insurance,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at A2 ("[A]s a

result of litigation, condo builders have seen liability insurance premiums on
such [condominium] projects soar, making it economically infeasible to build all
but the most expensive condos.").
104. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 10; Sichelman, supra note 10; Wedner, supra note 1; Zito, supra note 3.
105. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 10; Sichelman, supra note 10; Wedner, supra note 1; Zito, supranote 3.
106. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (1996 & Supp. 2003).
107. Id. For a general discussion of section 1375 as originally enacted, see
KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30.

108. The Calderon Process was named for Senator Calderon, who introduced
the bill and was its main proponent.
109. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29; see also ACRET, supra note 22, at
§ 8.45.
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interest developments of more than twenty units and therefore applies mainly to defect claims initiated by homeowners'
associations. "0
The original goal of the Calderon Process was to encourage more efficient resolution of construction defect disputes
by providing a mandatory period for settlement negotiation
before trial."1 ' As originally enacted, section 1375 required
plaintiffs to give builders notice of defects and results of testing for defects." 2 It also mandated a ninety-day settlement
period before a formal claim could be filed."' However, the
process was criticized as an ineffective way to limit litigation.14 Industry experts argued that the ninety-day period
required by the act was too short to promote meaningful negotiation, that the lack of penalties for noncompliance with
section 1375 requirements made the guidelines ineffective,
and that the statute did not effectively discourage litigation
5
because subcontractors were not required to participate."
The California legislature responded to criticism of the
original Calderon Process and the 2000 Aas decision by
amending the Calderon Process in 2001.16 The new provisions took effect for actions filed after July 1, 2002.'1 The revised Calderon Process is designed to include all parties and
make the prelitigation process more efficient."'
Under the new process, a homeowners' association must
first serve builders or developers with a "Notice of Com-

110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (West Supp. 2003).
111. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
112. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375.
113. See id.; see also KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
114. For a full discussion of the shortfalls of the original Calderon Process,
see Leslie Steven Marks & Ryan P. Eskin, Defective Solutions: Legislation Intended to Encourage the Resolution of Condominium Defect Disputes May In-

hibit Effective Association Management, L.A. LAWYER, Jan. 2003, at 39 (remarking that the section 1375 dispute resolution process "often seemed to be
nothing more than a speed bump on the road to full-blown litigation").
115. Id.; see also KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29 (remarking that "without
being legally compelled to participate, subcontractors and their carriers rarely
volunteered to contribute toward pretrial settlement offers, thereby increasing
plaintiffs' motivation to pursue larger awards through a trial").
116. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1375.
117. Id. § 1375.05(h).
118. See id.; see also KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29 (noting that the revisions to section 1375 are the result of compromise between builders, homeowners, and attorneys, and are thus likely to be fairly balanced in the burdens those
provisions impose).
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mencement of Legal Proceedings." 9 Service of this notice begins a 180-day period for the parties to attempt to resolve the
problems, 2 ° which may be extended with the consent of all
parties. 2' Alternatively, if the parties fail to reach a settlement by the end of the original or extended period, the association may then file an official complaint.' 2
Upon receipt of the notice, the builder must comply with
the timeline and requirements set forth in section 1375.123
Within twenty-five days of receipt, the builder may request a
meeting with the association.
Within sixty days, the
builder must (1) give the association access to relevant documents,1 25 and (2) send written notification to all subcontractors, design professionals, and insurers (collectively, "respondents"). 1'6 Following these disclosures,
the parties must select
2
a dispute resolution facilitator.'
The parties are required to attend a meeting with the facilitator and develop a case management plan within one
hundred days of the initial notice. 128 The main duty of the
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(b) (1996 & Supp. 2003). This notice should describe the project, provide an initial list of defects and an explanation of the
damage arising from those defects, and provide summaries of testing and homeowner surveys about the relevant defects. Id.
120. See id § 1375(c). This change doubled the settlement period.
121. Id.
122. See id. Parties may extend the original 180-day period for one additional period of 180 days; when the second period expires, the mandatory prelitigation requirements are complete. Id.
123. See id. § 1375(e).
124. See id. § 1375(d) (specifying that the meeting request must be made in
writing, and the meeting itself must take place not more than ten days after the
written request is made).
125. The association must provide the builder with the same access. CAL.
CIV. CODE. § 1375(e)(1). The goal of this section is to facilitate the discovery
process, as it requires each party to make available "all files reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding the defects
claimed." Id. Further, each party is required to prepare a privilege log for any
documents withheld based on the privilege. Id.
126. Id. § 1375(e)(2). The language regarding additional parties in this provision is fairly broad, requiring notice to "all subcontractors, design professionals, their insurers, and the insurers of any additional insured whose identities
are known to the respondent or readily ascertainable by review of the project
files or other similar sources and whose potential responsibility appears on the
face of the notice." The additional parties must then provide information about
their own insurers. Id.
127. See id. § 1375(f)(1). This selection meeting should occur not later than
twenty days after the respondent notifies subcontractors and other parties. CAL.
CIV. CODE. § 1375(f)(1).

128. Seeid. § 1375(f)(1).
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dispute resolution facilitator is to set case management
guidelines,129 and help the parties establish guidelines for fulfillment of required elements of the prelitigation process.l3
With the help of the facilitator, the parties will set deadlines
for submitting requests and settlement offers.' Respondents
are entitled to (1) request one meeting with the homeowners'
association board to discuss a settlement offer, and (2) make a
written settlement offer that includes an explanation of the
terms and reasons for the offer.'3 2
Within ten days of receiving a settlement offer, the association board must hold a meeting to decide whether to accept
or reject the offer.' 33 If the board decides to reject the offer
and file an action for damages, it must hold a meeting open toT
all members of the association before beginning the action,'
and provide all owners with written notice fifteen days prior
Upon completion of these requirements, 3 6
to that meeting.'
and assuming no resolution is reached, the homeowners' as129. See id. § 1375(h)-(j). The dispute resolution facilitator also has an overall duty to resolve the conflict in a "fair manner." See id. § 1375(f)()-(3).
130. See id. § 1375(h). These elements include (1) a "document depository,"
(2) a more detailed list of defects the association claims, (3) provisions for nonintrusive and invasive testing by the association and respondents (when necessary), (4) a "comprehensive" demand by the association (and appropriate allowances for modification of that demand), and (5) provisions for "facilitated dispute resolution of the claim" requiring parties with settlement authority to
attend dispute resolution sessions. Id.
131.

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(k).

132. See id. § 1375(k)(1)(A).
133. See id. § 1375(k)(C).
134. See id. § 1375(k)(D) (requiring the meeting to occur at least fifteen days
before the claim is filed).
135. See id. § 1375(k)(D). Notice of the meeting must be given at least fifteen
days before the meeting occurs, and must include the time and place of the
meeting, identification of the problems that lead to the settlement negotiations
and potential action, options/alternatives to address the problems, a discussion
of how the association can pay for those alternatives, and finally, the text of the
settlement offer and the explanation of the reasons for the terms of the offer.
Id. § 1375(k)(E).
136. Note that a respondent may petition the court to allow additional testing if the respondent shows all of the following: (1) the insurer for that respondent did not have notice of the 1375 claim at least thirty days prior to the time
inspections/testing began, (2) the insured party of that insurer did not participate in the inspections/testing, (3) the insurer retained separate counsel after
receiving notice that the formal complaint was filed and that counsel did not
participate in the section 1375 process, (4) the insured party is reasonably likely
to suffer prejudice if additional testing is not allowed, and (5) information the
party would obtain in the testing is not available from any other source. Id.
§ 1375.05(c).
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sociation may then file a formal action. 3 7 The homeowners'
association may also file suit if the respondent elects not to
provide a written statement. 138 When the association files a
formal complaint, section 1375.05 provides that the action
will be given trial priority, so that associations do not feel
time spent on settlement negotiations was a penalty.'3 9
Section 1375.05 also creates penalties for noncompliance
with the prelitigation procedures. 14 Parties who had notice of
the settlement negotiations but failed to participate will be
bound by any settlement reached.'
Once the action is filed,
any party may allege that another did not comply with the
section 1375 procedures by the association. 4 1 If the court
finds substantial noncompliance, it will stay the action for
ninety days to allow the delinquent party to establish compliance. 143
E. Senate Bill 800:. ConstructionDefects in Single Family
Homes
In September 2002 Governor Gray Davis signed into law
Senate Bill 800.1' Like the Calderon Process, Senate Bill 800
sets new standards governing construction defect claims, yet
it applies only to single family, non-condominium residences
purchased after January 1, 2003."
Codified in California
Civil Code sections 895-945.5, Senate Bill 800 incorporates
137. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375.05(a).
138. See id. § 1375 (k)(B). If the respondent either fails to submit, or elects
not to submit, an offer by the deadline established by the dispute resolution facilitator, the plaintiff/association is excused from satisfying the remaining requirements of section 1375(k), and is free to file a formal complaint. Id.
139. See id. § 1375.05 (a). Further, section 1376.05(b) provides that, in assigning this trial priority, the court must consider the date of service of the notice on the builder as the filing date of the complaint, and assign the earliest
possible trial date.
140. See id. § 1375.05(g).
141. See id. § 1375.05(d).
142. Id.§ 1375.
143. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375.05(g). When a party makes an allegation of
noncompliance, the court will schedule a hearing to determine whether or not
there was "substantial noncompliance" with the prelitigation procedures. Id.
§ 1375.05(g)(2)-(3). Remedies for noncompliance are within the discretion of the
court, determined in part by the extent of compliance with the section. Id.
§ 1375.05(g)(3)(B).
144. The law was codified as Civil Code section 895-945.5 (West 2004), but is
commonly referred to in recent articles addressing construction defects as "Senate Bill 800." See, e.g., Marks & Eskin, supra note 114.
145. CAL. CIv. CODE § 895(f).
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and expands upon the prelitigation requirements that were
originally developed in the Calderon Process. 46 The prelitigation procedures in Senate Bill 800 provide owners of residences to which the law applies with three options for dispute
resolution before they can file a defect claim, including147repair
of the alleged defects, mediation, or a cash settlement.
The sale of a new home triggers the provisions of Senate
Bill 800.14' The statute requires builders to choose at the time
the home is sold whether they will use a dispute resolution
method other than the procedures outlined in the statute in
the event of a dispute over a defect in the home, and to notify
the buyer of that choice no later than close of escrow. 149 This
choice of dispute resolution methods is binding on the builder,
buyer, and buyer's successors in interest, and if the builder
does not choose an alternative process at the time of sale, he
will be bound to the statutory requirements. 150
Under Senate Bill 800, a homeowner initiates the claim
process by sending written notice of the defect or defects to
the builder, stating that the owner is alleging a defect, and
5
describing the character, nature, and location of that defect.1 '
The builder then has fourteen days to acknowledge receipt of
the homeowner's notice in writing.'52 The builder may inspect
the alleged defects (but must request to perform tests) and
complete that inspection within fourteen days after acknowl146. Essentially, this statute applies only to single family residential construction because defects in condominium projects are governed by the Calderon

Process. Id.
147. Id. § 914(a) describes the goal of the dispute resolution process required
by the statute. "This chapter establishes a non-adversarial procedure, including
the remedies available under this chapter which, if the procedure does not resolve the dispute between the parties, may result in a subsequent action to enforce the other chapters of this title." Id.
148. Id. § 938.
149. The choice of dispute resolution is binding on the builder:
At the time the sales agreement is executed, the builder shall notify the
homeowner whether the builder intends to engage in the nonadversarial procedure of this section or attempt to enforce alternative
non-adversarial contractual provisions. If the builder elects to use alternative non-adversarial contractual provisions in lieu of this chapter,
the election is binding, regardless of whether the builder's alternative
non-adversarial contractual provisions are successful in resolving the
ultimate dispute or are ultimately deemed enforceable.
Id. § 914(a).
150. Id.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 910.
152. Id. § 913.
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edging receipt of the homeowner's notice of defects.'5 3 If the
builder determines that additional testing is necessary, he
must request an additional inspection within three days of
the initial inspection, and complete the second inspection
within forty days of the initial tests." The builder is responsible for all costs of the inspections and must also provide
adequate assurance that any damage caused during the tests
will be promptly repaired.'55
Within thirty days of the final inspection, the builder
must choose one of three options: (1) make no settlement offer
at all and allow the litigation to proceed, (2) make a cash settlement offer, or (3) make an offer to repair the defects.'56 Obviously, a builder who elects not to make any offer at all
chooses to accept the costs and consequences of litigation.
Similarly, a homeowner who receives a cash settlement offer
has the unqualified right to either accept the cash payment or
reject the offer and proceed to litigation.5 7 As a result, builders who offer cash settlements take the risk of allowing the
homeowner to decide whether or not to litigate."8 In contrast,
offering to repair the problem may lower a builder's risk of
litigation because the statute gives builders an absolute right
to repair the defects before the homeowner can initiate the
process of litigation."9
The offer to repair must contain "a detailed, specific,
step-by-step statement identifying the particular violation
that is being repaired, explain[] the nature, scope, and location of the repair, set[] a reasonable completion date for the
repair,"" ° and must be accompanied by a statement offering
to mediate if the homeowner so chooses.' 6 ' Builders who de-

153. Id. § 916(a).
154. Id. § 916(c).
155. Id. § 916(a).
156. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 916-917.
157. The statute allows the builder to obtain a reasonable release from the
homeowner for a cash settlement. Id. § 929(B).
158. Since the homeowner is only required to allow repair efforts, builders
who make offers that do not include repair take the risk of owners rejecting
those offers simply because they are not required to accept them. See id.
§ 929(a).
159. See id. § 919 (allowing builders to repair defects if mediation fails to resolve disputes over the builder's settlement/repair offer); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
160. Id. § 917.
161. Id. § 919.
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cide to repair only some of the claimed defects must include a
detailed explanation of the reasons the offer does not provide
for repair of every defect. 62 If homeowners choose to allow
the builder to repair, they have thirty days after receiving the
offer to either authorize the repairs set forth or request that
the builder provide the names of up to three additional contractors to complete the repair work.163 The builder must provide the names of additional contractors within thirty-five
days of such a request, and a homeowner then has twenty
days to choose one of those contractors and notify the builder
of that choice."
Alternatively, the homeowner can respond to an offer by
requesting mediation of the dispute. The mediation session is
limited to four hours and must occur within fifteen days of
the date of the homeowner request." The mediator should be
selected and paid for by the builder;66 homeowners who want
to participate in choosing the mediator must pay half the cost
of the mediation session.'6 7 However, the statute gives the
builder the right to repair even if the parties do not reach a
mutually agreeable result at the mediation: "If a builder has
made an offer to repair a violation, and the mediation has
failed to resolve the dispute, the homeowner shall allow the
repair to be performed either by the builder, its contractor, or
the selected contractor."'6 8
Finally, builders may be penalized for failing to comply
with the prelitigation requirements.'6 9 A builder's failure to
respond to homeowner concerns or complete any of the prelitigation requirements within the specified time frames will
constitute a waiver of all rights to which builders are entitled;
a homeowner may dispense with the prelitigation requirements and file a formal claim as soon as the builder fails to
comply with any statutory requirement. 70 In contrast, if a
162. CAL. CIV. CODE § 924.
163. Id. § 918.
164. Id.

165. Id. § 919.
166. Id. However, the statute does not define "nonaffiliated mediator."
167. Id.
168. CAL. CIV. CODE § 919.
169. See id. § 915.
170. See id. § 919 (releasing homeowner from further compliance with prelitigation requirements if builder fails to acknowledge the notice or request an
inspection within the required timeframe); id. § 916(d) (releasing the homeowner from prelitigation requirements if builder fails to actually complete the
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homeowner fails to comply with the requirements before filing a formal claim, builders may only request a stay of the action until the requirements have been satisfied. 7 '
From an evidentiary standpoint, all communications occurring during the prelitigation process between homeowners
and builders, with the exception of the four hour mediation,
are admissible in subsequent proceedings.' 2 The fact that the
builder makes efforts to repair the defect will not prevent the
homeowner from offering evidence of the condition of the
property before the repair. 17 3 Similarly, the fact that the
builder attempted repair is also admissible. Further, the
statute specifies that "evidence of both parties' conduct during this process may be introduced during a subsequent enforcement action, if any.' 74
The prelitigation requirements of both the Calderon
Process as well as Senate Bill 800 highlight two significant
issues facing parties in residential construction defect disputes. First, although prelitigation statutes exist to encourage settlement, and the primary interests of the parties involved in these cases are quite divergent, it is unclear
whether the statutes will in fact achieve this goal or simply
delay formal litigation. '5 Homeowners want to be compensated for shoddy construction affecting the value of their
homes; builders want to minimize litigation costs and avoid
paying large awards; the government wants to ease the bur176
den that prolonged defect cases create for the court system.
Second, given the various theories of liability available to
homeowners in construction defect actions, as well as the ambiguities that remain after recent decisions such as Aas,
inspection in the required time); id. § 920 (releasing homeowner from further
compliance with prelitigation requirements if builder fails to make an offer, or
complete the repair, within the specified timeframe).
171. Id. § 930(b).
172. See id. §§ 933-934.
173. Id.
174. CAL. CIV. CODE

§§

933-934.

175. See, e.g., John Boyden, Chapter40 and Construction Defect LitigationBoom or Bust, NEV. LAWYER, Jan. 2002 (arguing that the Nevada prelitigation
procedures may, in fact, encourage litigation because homeowners have little to
lose in taking their claims to court); Marks & Eskin, supra note 114 (arguing
that mandatory homeowner association disclosure of settlement offers to owners
may have a chilling effect on defect litigation because required disclosure could
compromise the association's position of authority).
176. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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many prelitigation statutes provide no clear guidelines for
judging what kind of damage should be actionable, creating
7
an additional barrier to meaningful settlement negotiations.'1
III. PROBLEM
Both the Calderon Process revisions and Senate Bill 800
were designed to address the main concerns about construction defect litigation in California."8 Several other states
have enacted similar laws with a similar goal of minimizing
litigation. 9 However, the newness of the statutes, particularly the fact that they have not yet been extensively tested in
court or otherwise, makes it difficult to determine whether
the statutes will generate any meaningful benefits. 80
States drafting or revising prelitigation statutes for construction defect actions must consider several factors. Statutes of limitation specifically designed to address construction
defect actions vary among states.' 8' In some states, the extent
of damage required for valid claims is not clearly defined.'82
In addition, the timing and extent of pre-trial or prelitigation
procedures is often not clearly defined.'
Given the increas177. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375; see also supra Part II.A-B.
178. For a summary of the original Calderon process, criticism of that process, and the revised elements, see Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 39-46.
179. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Washington Law ConsideredNew Model
in Disputes Between Homeowners and Buyers, REALTY TIMEs, July 8, 2002,
availableat http://realtytimes.com/printrtpages/20020708_newhomelaw.com.
180. See, e.g., Boyden, supra note 175, at 10 (arguing that a Nevada prelitigation statute for construction defect cases may be unfavorable to homeowners);
Ronald M. Sandgrund et al., The ConstructionDefect Action Reform Act, COLO.
LAW., Oct. 2001, at 121 (summarizing a Colorado prelitigation statute and raising issues that still need to be addressed).
181. For a summary of statutes of limitation for construction defects in California, see supra note 46.
182. Many states are slowly recognizing the problems of construction defect
litigation, and courts are increasingly applying the economic loss doctrine, as
the California Supreme Court did in Aas. See, e.g., Calloway v. City of Reno,
993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 2000) (applying economic loss doctrine to limit negligence
claims for construction defects in Nevada). Definitions of "construction defect"
in state statutes vary dramatically. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.615 (2003)
(defining "constructional defect" as including "a defect in design, construction,
manufacture, repair, or landscaping..."); COLO. REV. STAT. 13-20-804 (2002)
(limiting negligence claims for construction defects if claim arises from failure to
construct in substantial compliance with building codes and standards, subject
to exceptions for actual and probable damage and personal injury); CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 896-897 (containing an extensive list of types of defects California will
consider "actionable" in defect cases).
183. Supplying an initial list of defects to a builder or developer is fairly
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ing popularity of prelitigation statutes"' and the different approaches states take to address the construction defect problem,185 California's experience in developing and revising such
statutes is an important factor to consider when formulating
an effective prelitigation process for residential construction
defect cases.
IV. ANALYSIS
In practice, there has been little time to test the effectiveness of prelitigation statutes for construction defects." 6
To the extent that the prelitigation provisions of the Calderon
Process and Senate Bill 800 were designed to address problems related to construction defect litigation, they certainly
improve the opportunity for early settlement of claims."7
However, both the Calderon Process and Senate Bill 800 may
not be efficient or effective enough to meet the needs of homeowners and developers in resolving construction defects.'88
standard among states regulating or proposing regulation for construction defect cases. See NEV. REV. STAT § 40.645 (requiring claimants to give written notice with "reasonable detail" of defects alleged sixty days prior to filing the action, and providing a forty-five day period for contractors to inspect); ARIZ. H.B.
2034 (2003) (proposing ninety-day period giving builders the opportunity to fix
problems before owners may sue); Colo. H.B. 1161 (2003) (proposing requirement for owners to give ninety days notice before filing suit); see also discussion
of Calderon Process revisions supraPart III.D.
184. Legislatures in Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, and Texas considered
bills relating to construction defect litigation in their 2003 sessions. See, e.g.,
Donna Halvorsen & Karen Youso, Bill Would Curb Lawsuits over Home Defects; Builders Insurance Costs Soar, STAR TRIB.-MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, Feb.
14, 2003, at 1D; Peggy Lowe, Building Controversy;Curbing Lawsuits on Home
Constructiona Bad Move, Some Say, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 18, 2003, at
5A; Adolpho Pesquera, CompetingBills in Legislature;BuildingLaw Brouhaha:
Proposalto Set Up Industry-ControlledPanel to Regulate Builders Raises Concern, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Mar. 14, 2003, at lE; Chip Scutari & Chris
Fiscus, Homeowners May Face Suit Obstacle; Builders Push for MajorityApprovalin HOAs to Go to Court,ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2003, at B1.
185. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. 13-20-801 to 804 (2002) (limiting negligence
claims for construction defect actions) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (2004) (providing prelitigation procedures for construction defect actions).
186. California's experience with the original Calderon Process and revisions
is perhaps the most extensive among states with prelitigation procedures, and
even though the process has been revised, the original statute was only enacted
in 1995. See, e.g., Marks & Eskin, supra note 114.
187. See id. at 40-41; see also Roger Haerr, A Condo Divided: New Law
Means Big Changes for Construction Defect Litigation, RECORDER, June 26,
2002, at 4 ("The only real winners were plaintiffs' contingency lawyers and their
experts."); KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30.
188. See discussion infra Part IIC.
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A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Revised Calderon
Process
Several elements of the revised Calderon Process effec189
tively address concerns about condominium defect cases.
By requiring participation of all subcontractors and interested parties in defect investigations and settlement discussions, 9 ° the process encourages more thorough analysis of
claims and helps increase the parties' chances of reaching a
settlement before formal litigation is initiated."' Early involvement of subcontractors and insurers can only make the
negotiation process more efficient, given the great likelihood
of their eventual involvement. 92
The revised Calderon Process also allows a longer period
to resolve disputes and achieve settlements.'9 3 The revisions
not only doubled the settlement period (from 90 to 180 days),
but also created additional flexibility for the parties to extend
the 180-day minimum settlement period."9
The longer time
period for dispute resolution gives respondents time to identify and notify the other parties that should be involved, and
allows for more detailed inspection and testing of defects and
claims.' 9' The section 1375 provisions giving respondents ad189. See Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 40-41; Haerr, supra note 187;
KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30.

190. See Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 40 ("[W]ithout the participation
of subcontractors and insurers, developers were left alone to grapple with the
economic burdens of settlement. In many circumstances, the absence of these
necessary parties in the Calderon process forced developers to bring subsequent
indemnity suits against subcontractors, which resulted in increased litigation.").
191. Id.; see also KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29 (noting that plaintiffs had
an incentive to take their cases to trial under the original Calderon Process because subcontractors seldom volunteered to participate in the pretrial settlement process or to contribute to settlement offers, but would be included in formal litigation).
192. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
193. See generally Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 40-41; Haerr, supra
note 187.
194. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(c) (2004) (doubling the prelitigation settlement period from ninety days to 180 days, and allowing the 180-day period to be
extended upon agreement of all parties).
195. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30 (noting the extended time period and commenting on the benefits of the expanded information-sharing process-"this step expands the knowledge base accessible to all parties, purely for
the purpose of identifying prospects for early resolution"); see also Marks &
Eskin, supra note 114, at 40 (noting that the 90-day period was simply too
short, and remarking, "by the time the developer had finished analyzing the association's defect list and related materials and had conducted its own inspec-
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ditional time to investigate and test the defect allegations can
meet this need.'96
The revised guidelines for testing and investigation in
section 1375 will also help facilitate the dispute resolution
process.'9 7 Investigation and testing of defects is a critical
part of the settlement process because investigation allows
both homeowners and respondents to assess the magnitude of
the claims.'98 Section 1375 addresses this component by allowing both parties to investigate defects and requiring them
to share the results of any tests.' 99 Full disclosure of testing
results can assist both respondents and homeowners' associations because all parties will have the same information with
which to prepare and evaluate settlement offers. 2O Investigation and information-sharing gives both sides in a dispute
equal access to information as well as the opportunity to
make practical and informed decisions about the most effective way to proceed with defect claims.2 '
Provisions requiring homeowner associations to disclose
settlement agreements to owners and meet with those owners
to discuss settlement options may also help promote settlement.2 ' Builders may be able to use the offer to argue the
benefits of settlement because section 1375 requires respondents to give reasons for their offer.2"3 Clearly articulated
reasons for each component of a settlement offer can also give
associations and owners better insight into the builder's perspective on specific defect claims,"' and help them evaluate
their defect claims and weigh the costs and benefits of settlement.2 °5
tion and testing, the 90-day period typically had expired").
196. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 1375(c).
197. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30.
198. See id.
199. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1375(e).
200. See id. § 1375(k) (requiring respondents to include an explanation of
reason for the terms of any settlement offer).
201. See Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 41 (noting that the same rules
for document disclosure apply to all parties).
202. See Dunstan & Swenson, supra note 2, at 5 (observing that associations
were previously not required to notify homeowners, and many builders perceived that the associations were pressured to file suits by attorneys).
203. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(k) (requiring respondents to include explanations for the terms of their settlement offers, and requiring associations to dis-

close the full text of those offers to homeowners).
204. See id
205. The section 1375 requirement of homeowner participation in a meeting
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The greatest strengths of the revised Calderon Process lie
in the components that give both sides of the dispute equal
opportunities to obtain and evaluate information related to
the defects. °s This balanced discovery and exchange of information can help ease respondent concerns about extensive
lists of defects.0 7 Even so, the Calderon Process may not address all concerns about the resolution of condominium defect
claims. °8
Section 1375 sets no standards for defects and damages
that should merit reasonable claims, and contains no provisions to discourage associations from making claims about
minor defects.0 9 Under the Calderon Process, builders can
only defend against claims for inconsequential defects by excluding such claims from a settlement offer.210 Furthermore,
the statute lacks any clear incentives for homeowners' associations to accept such offers in lieu of litigation. 1 ' Because
the Calderon Process does not clearly define which defects
will be actionable if a case proceeds to litigation, builders gain
only limited benefits from the dispute resolution require-

to analyze the costs and benefits of taking the claims to court provides an additional layer of "review" for associations to consider their claims. See id.
§ 1375(k)(D)-(E).
206.

See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 30.

207. The provisions allowing respondents to conduct testing on the homes
can help ease builder concerns about extensive lists of defects by allowing them
to investigate the defects first hand, and by allowing-and even requiringthem to explain the components of their settlement offers.

See CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 1375(e), (h), (k).
208. See KROLL ET AL., supra note 6, at 29 (characterizing the dispute resolution provisions of the Calderon Process as "relatively weak"); see also SAN
DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 2, at 8-10 (discussing factors that may be needed to reduce unnecessary defect litigation, including clear statutory definitions of construction defects and warranty programs).
209. From a legal standpoint, the broad definition of damages in CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 337.15 as "any deficiency in the design, specifications, surveying,
planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of an improvement to, or survey of, real property" is favorable to homeowners making
claims for any defect, regardless of the damage that defect has caused.
210. Respondents have discretion over which items they include in settlement offers. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(k).
211. Association refusal to settle may be attributed to a number of factors
and choices. See Wedner, supra note 1, at 2 (quoting homeowner attorney,
"these lawsuits are worth it because homeowners are stuck with a choice: either
pay for the damages out of their pockets, or make the builder responsible....
The average consumer doesn't have the expertise to investigate the cause of defects or make proper repairs.").
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ment.112 Without guidelines to describe reasonable claims for
defects, the Calderon Process does little to assist developers
and builders who view claims for "incidental" defects as one of
the greatest problems with construction defect litigation. '
Although the procedures encourage communication and settlement, the realities of judicial treatment of defect claims
may outweigh the incentives for homeowner associations to
settle in the prelitigation phase."'
As a result of those weaknesses, associations may still
have the "upper hand" in condominium defect cases because
neither the Calderon Process nor the decisions in Aas and
Hicks substantially discourage claims for minor defects.2 15
While prelitigation procedures encourage thorough evaluation
of settlement offers, homeowner associations retain full discretion in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer and
proceed with litigation.21 In this sense, plaintiff homeowners'
associations may have little to lose by rejecting settlement offers and proceeding to court when offers fail to include all of
the claimed defects.217
Finally, although the Calderon Process has fairly strict
penalties for parties who do not participate,2 18 the penalties
for noncompliance-a stay of the action merely to establish
compliance 2 9-with the procedures are relatively weak.22 °
Without penalties for noncompliance, respondents often try to
impede or delay the process. 2 ' Until the scope of "substantial
212. See SAN DIEGO ASS'N, supra note 21, at 9 (noting that "some feel that
the lack of a precise, carefully limited definition of construction defect allows
litigation for merely cosmetic defects as well as more serious problems.").
213. ID. at 5.
214. See Sandgrund et al., supra note 180, at 123 (commenting on a similar
law in Colorado and the fact that no clear understanding of the concept of "damage").
215. See Castro, supra note 20 (discussing how the decisions in Aas and
Hicks affect the theories of liability plaintiffs use in defect cases, but not necessarily the types of claims they allege).
216. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375(k) (2004).

217. See Wedner, supra note 1 (discussing the fact that, in many cases,
homeowners choose to make formal claims after receiving inadequate settlement offers because they do not have the expertise or resources to resolve defects themselves).
218. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375.05(d) (specifying that any party who had notice of but failed to participate in the dispute resolution process will be bound by
any settlement reached and will be included in the allocation of the settlement).
219. See id. § 1375.05 (g)(3)(A).
220. See id
221. See Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 45 (noting tendency of respon-
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compliance" with the Calderon Process is defined, noncompliance and delays remain a risk in the prelitigation phase.222
B.

Senate Bill 800 PrelitigationProcess
1.

Time Limits

The time limits in Senate Bill 800 for investigation of and
response to defects were likely developed to prevent parties
from prolonging cases. In practice, however, the actual timeframes for complying with the prelitigation requirements may
not provide enough time for parties to investigate and fully
consider the merits of defect claims.22 Because the builder
has only fourteen days to complete testing and investigations,
the right to repair elements of the statute will likely benefit
the homeowner because the builder will have less time to
evaluate the severity and intricacies of defect claims.224 Although the builder may request a time extension for additional testing, the pressure will remain on the builder to meet
the time limits or lose the right to repair. In some cases, it
may simply be easier for the builder to offer to repair, even if
the extent of the
defect is questionable, than risk losing the
2
right to repair. 1
Further, the burdens of the prelitigation time limits may
not be evenly allocated, because the builder is responsible for
meeting deadlines after the homeowner sends notice. 226 After
the homeowner initiates the process by giving notice, the
builder alone is responsible for coordinating investigations
and testing, and formulating the offer to repair in the required time. 227 Arguably, this burden on builders could be
balanced by the fact that they have an absolute right to repair after complying with the requirements, regardless of any
dents to try to delay the process by refusing to participate or complicating discovery).
222. Id. at 41.
223. See Mark Cameron, Change to Spare: The New California Construction
Warranty and Defects Law, 13 MILLER & STARR REAL ESTATE NEWS ALERT
(Jan. 2003) (observing that "builders may find it difficult to meet the new statutory deadlines.... [and] homeowners may be shocked to learn that to pursue
court claims their new homes may first be entered and repaired whether they
like it or not").
224. See id.
225. See id
226. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 912 (2004).
227. See id. §§ 916-917.
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dispute a homeowner has with the repair offer.228 However, if
the times allowed do not provide enough time for gaining
adequate information, builders may feel that the process is
not entirely fair because they do not have time to gather adequate information to make informed decisions.
2.

Offer to Repair

The Senate Bill 800 requirement for submitting the offer
to repair could potentially foreclose negotiated solutions that
might be more successful or easier for both builders and
homeowners.229 Senate Bill 800 gives the builder the right to
specify the repairs that will be completed, and to propose a
completion date and contractor to perform those repairs-a
process that makes it easier for the homeowner to obtain repairs because the problem can be resolved without litigation
and the builder will organize the repair attempt. 20 However,
the fact that Senate Bill 800 encourages builders to repair all
defects that might be actionable,2 3 ' and requires homeowners
to accept those offers to repair, also tends to reduce or eliminate the opportunity for those parties to develop other solutions that might meet their needs more effectively. 32 Proponents of prelitigation might argue that a dispute resolution
method in addition to repair is unnecessary because the main
goal of most homeowners is to get the problems fixed, but the
required procedures allow only minimal flexibility, which may
discourage parties from negotiating a personalized solution
more appropriate to their needs.233
228. Id. § 919.
229. See Cameron, supra note 223 (noting one difficulty that might arise in
the mandatory right to repair: "The trust and cooperation usually required for
successful repair efforts are often lost early in the clams process, yet the right to
repair will survive that loss as long as other requirements are met").
230. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 917.
231. The extent of this requirement remains somewhat vague. For example,
a homeowner might give notice to a builder of specific claims, but additional defects could be uncovered in the course of investigation and testing. Since the
statute is meant to be broadly construed, a builder would likely have to offer to
repair the newly discovered defects, even though the homeowner did not include
those problems in the original complaint.
232. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and FathersofInvention: The IntellectualFoundersofADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RESOL. 1 (2000) ("The morality
of mediation lies in optimum settlement, a settlement in which each party gives
up what he values less, in return for what he values more.").
233. Because of the goal and importance already discussed of increasing parties' satisfaction with the repairs, it will be important to preserve mediation as
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Mediation

Senate Bill 800 requires builders to make an offer to mediate, but homeowners alone choose whether to actually participate in mediation. 2' Because the parties will likely enter
mediation with diverging interests and attitudes, attempts to
compromise through mediation might be frustrated.23 5 For
example, homeowners may request mediation because they
are unhappy with the contents of a repair offer, but builders
may be disillusioned when their offer to fix the alleged problem does not satisfy those homeowners.2 36 Further, the fact
that builders retain the right to repair, regardless of mediation, creates little incentive for them to actively participate
and creates a real risk of defeating both the purpose and the
potential of mediation. 237 The factors preceding the mediation
still seem to weigh in favor of the builder because the builder
will still get to attempt repair and thus has little to lose by
ignoring concerns that the homeowner raises in mediation
about the offer to repair.
Assuming that the prelitigation requirements of Senate
Bill 800 prove too restrictive for homeowners and builders, or
otherwise do not meet the needs or desires of builders,23 8 the
statute also gives the builder the choice of opting out of its
prelitigation requirements by choosing an alternative dispute
the first dispute resolution effort. Mediation seems particularly suited to pro-

moting the feeling of a fair and personally satisfying process, because the job of
a mediator can be described as "assisting parties to clarify issues, to develop
agendas, to communicate 'reasonable and fair' offers, and to work on easy issues
first seem to pay off in better settlements." Deborah M. Kolb & Jeffrey Z.
Rubin, Mediation Through a Disciplinary Kaleidoscope, 4 DR FORUM 3, 7
(1989).
234. The fact that homeowners make the decision unilaterally suggests that
in many cases mediation will not necessarily be a mutual choice because the
builder is required to offer it, but may not sincerely want to participate.
235. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) ("[T]he
distribution of financial resources, or the ability of one party to pass along its
costs, will invariably infect the bargaining process, and the settlement will be at
odds with a conception of justice.. .
236. See generallyid.

237. The builder will, of course, be subject to any applicable legal and ethical
requirements to negotiate in good faith. See generally John Lande, Using Dispute Design System Methods to Promote Good Faith Participationin CourtConnectedMediationPrograms,50 UCLA L. REV. 69 (2002).
238. See Roger B. Coven, California Attempts to Resolve Residential Construction Defect Claims Without Litigation, 23 CONSTR. LAWYER 35 (2003) (observing that "unless the builder is successful in satisfying the homeowner, SB
800 may do little more than delay the inevitable).
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resolution method at the time of sale.3 9 While this may seem
to allow for greater flexibility in choosing a method of dispute
resolution, the fact that the builder must choose a method at
the time a house is sold rather than when a dispute arises
may not maximize the dispute resolution potential. For example, the value of the claim and the type of defect would
likely be factors influencing the choice of dispute resolution
method, but the builder has no real way of knowing the exact
nature of potential disputes at the time the house is sold. 40
On the other hand, the fact that the Senate Bill 800 process is prelitigation may ease concerns about time limits and
alternative processes as long as builders have enough time to
gather the resources they need to make an informed offer.24'
Because the statute is so new, it is probably too early to tell
whether or not efforts to resolve claims under the Senate Bill
800 prelitigation process will be hampered by the restrictions
on time and process.242 If the provisions prove workable, both
owners and builders will benefit from because defects will be
repaired and full litigation will be avoided.242
IV. PROPOSAL
The prelitigation requirements in the revised Calderon
Process and Senate Bill 800 improve the dispute resolution

239. CAL. CIV. CODE § 914 (2004).
240. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation:A Study of Strategiesin
Search ofa Theory,ABF RES. J. 905, 925-28 (1983).
241. Essentially, the prelitigation process is only a starting point for parties
litigating such claims. Both laws allow homeowners to file formal claims after
the prelitigation process is completed. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 926, 1375.05.
242. The defect definitions and the builder right to repair are new. Litigation
is often drawn out for extended periods of time because parties fight over
whether or not certain defects should be actionable. The definitions in SB 800
will help eliminate this ambiguity. Further, builders have never had an absolute right to repair a defect; the hope for this provision is that repair would go
directly to the main goal of homeowners, that is, fixing the defect.
243. See Stephen C. Gerrish & E. David Marks, Construction Defect Litiga-

tion: The PlayingFieldHas Changed;A NavigationalGuide to Senate Bill 800,
26 REAL PROP. LAWYER 106 (2003):

The legislature worked with both the building industry and trial lawyers to devise a law that would give both groups more protection. The
result is a law that establishes extensive new rights, obligations, and
remedies, representing a compromise between both groups.

The two

sides worked right up to the end of the legislative year to obtain this
compromise ....

Id. at 106.
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potential for construction defect claims. 24 By encouraging
communication between parties and within the homeowners'
associations themselves, the Calderon Process helps increase
the chances of settlement.2 45 Similarly, the mediation and offer to repair provisions of Senate Bill 800 promote communication and encourage parties to address repair directly and
early.2 "
The requirement of the right to repair is a fairly narrow
solution for residential construction defect claims which may
initially limit the scope of remedies that parties might otherwise consider. 24' Repair, dictated as the final remedy in the
prelitigation stage, should not bar parties from trying to negotiate a settlement that can more effectively accommodate
their needs.248
The repair remedy is valuable because repair is easy for
both parties; it offers the builder a quick resolution of the defect claim and, in most cases, will meet homeowner goals of
correcting the construction defect.249 However, where homeowners request mediation, builders may find the homeowners'
dissatisfaction irritating. Negotiating a settlement may be
frustrated by the fact that the two parties have only a limited
interest in preserving an ongoing relationship.2 5 °
244. See generally Haerr, supra note 187; Marks & Eskin, supra note 114;
Wedner, supra note 1.
245. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1375 (2004).
246. See Marks & Eskin, supra note 114, at 40-41.
247. Dispute resolution in construction defect could potentially lead to a wide
range of solutions if there wer no repair requirement. This paper focuses only
on dispute resolution within the context of the SB 800 and Civil Code section
1375 prelitigation provisions, analyzing the potential interaction of the right to
repair and other dispute resolution mechanisms.
248. The goal is, after all, to promote settlement. Since the statutes do not
bar further litigation, the success of any resolution under this statute will necessarily be dictated by the satisfaction of parties involved and final resolution at
the prelitigation stage. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 926, 1375.05.
249. See Cameron, supra note 223. This author predicts the future of Senate
Bill 800 by stating:
As a practical matter, SB 800 should expedite repairs on some construction claims, bar homeowners from the courthouse during the repair period, ease consumer burdens of proof, impose on builders statutory obligations to deliver residential units which meet minimum
system performance standards, and foster constructive dialogue before
attorneys take over the process of determining appropriate repair
needs.
Id.
250. For the most part, homeowners want compensation for the problems,
while builders may be interested in limiting expensive litigation. See Jeffrey W.
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Allowing for additional dispute resolution techniques in
both Senate Bill 800 and the Calderon Process might help facilitate early settlement, depending on the severity and extent of claims. Although additional dispute resolution for
small defect claims that are relatively easy and inexpensive
to repair might not promote efficiency, expansion of dispute
resolution options for larger claims would likely be worthwhile because the parties would have a greater opportunity to
reach an amicable settlement. In disputes over repair offers
that are related to defects with a larger value, the four hour
limit that Senate Bill 800 imposes on mediation may not be
enough to allow homeowners to be sufficiently satisfied with
the prelitigation result.25 ' Supplementing the current Senate
Bill 800 provisions to provide additional opportunities for
builders and homeowners to reach settlements may increase
the chances of satisfying the parties and preventing further
litigation."'
Since Senate Bill 800 gives the builder an absolute right
Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic. LiberatingADR from Ideology, 2000
J. DIsP. RESL. 247, 286 (2000). This author observes that a relationship between parties is not critical if
the dispute is often about money or that which is easily reduced to
money. Each party has an incentive not so much to get along with the
other side but to strike the best arrangement possible. Getting along
reasonably well with the adversary is helpful to furthering the goal of
an optimal monetary compromise but is not likely to be a prime goal in
itself.
Id. A similar idea would apply to defect claims because the parties do not necessarily have a true relationship, but they do need to get along in order to reach
a resolution and because the builder will be entering the home to complete the
repairs.
251. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
252. Several authors suggest that the parties' satisfaction with the process
can matter just as much as the result. This idea seems particularly relevant
when the result is essentially already dictated by statute. See, e.g., John
Lande, Using Dispute Design Methods to Promote Good Faith Participationin
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 119 (2002). Although this article primarily addresses court-connected mediation, some ideas
about the interest of parties could apply to the preliminary stages of construction defect claims:
Parties are more likely to feel satisfied if their actual mediation experience meets or exceeds their expectations. Parties are more likely to
feel satisfied with mediation when they feel that they have opportunities for meaningful self-expression and participation in determining the
outcome. Parties are also more satisfied when they believe that the
mediation process is fair, understandable, informative, attentive to
their interests, impartial, uncoerced, and private.
Id. at 118 (citations omitted).
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to repair, homeowners may feel that they have less leverage
in ensuring that the repair efforts are acceptable to them."'
Defect statutes are premised on the idea that repair will appease homeowners and discourage them from pursuing litigation.254 Recognizing and protecting the interests of homeowners can make these statutes more successful. Quite simply,
limiting the mediation for complex defect cases to four hours
may not be enough to ease homeowner concerns about proposed repairs, and may create a risk of truncating discussions
that could be beneficial.
Dispute resolution in construction defect cases should
more fully promote open discussion of repair proposals to encourage builders to look beyond the fact that they have a
right to repair regardless of the mediation outcome. 55 Requiring parties to split mediation costs would perhaps impose a
slightly greater financial burden for homeowners, but could
also create a better sense of neutrality for both parties and a
greater sense for homeowners that their interests are being
protected during the mediation.256
Another way to ensure that builders actively participate
in mediation would be to set an arbitration date before the
mediation occurs.5 7 By setting a date for arbitration before
the mediation begins, or by agreeing to a mediation/arbitration, builders will know that if they cannot reach
an agreement a neutral party will make a decision that could
potentially affect their repair offer. Although expanding the
dispute resolution process to include arbitration might seem
excessive at the prelitigation stage, particularly given that
the subject of mediation is essentially limited to the terms of
a builder's repair offer, the goal of the statute is also to make
253. See generallyCAL. CIV. CODE § 895-935.
254. See Harney, supra note 94.
255. See Lande, supra note 253, at 123 (noting that "mediation programs are
likely to promote productive behavior when participants are ready to mediate
seriously and if the mediation techniques address the participants' interests").
256. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality
and Reform in a TransactionalSystem, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463, 505 (1998) (noting that "homeowners' lack of technical expertise may place them at a real or
perceived disadvantage in negotiations with builders").
257. This is apparently a common practice in construction defect cases. One
attorney stated that he refuses to attend mediation if an arbitration date is not
set first because builders simply will not participate fully in mediation unless
they know that a "real decision" may be made by someone else if the parties do
not reach agreement.
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sure that both parties are happy with repairs so that the
cases do not proceed to litigation. 2" For homeowners, the
benefit of making both processes available is that the mediation will allow them to articulate their problems directly to
the builder and discuss the merits of the repair offer with the
builders,'" but if those discussions do not result in a solution,
a neutral expert's decision about the most appropriate repair
strategy can make the process seem less dominated by the
builder's repair terms.26" The most efficient process would
likely be a mediation/arbitration proceeding, so that the
whole process could be decided and completed in a day, and
particularly so that the entire process can be completed
within the original timeframe contemplated by a prelitigation
statute. 6 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Construction defect cases involve complicated claims, is-

258. See HIBBERD & NEWMAN, ADR AND ADJUDICATION IN CONSTRUCTION
DISPUTES 60 (1999) ("[A]s facilitator the mediator does not become pro-active by
proposing or attempting to impose a solution, but rather promotes a realistic
understanding by each party of the other's interest."). Because statute dictates
and mandates the "rights" of each party, the mediation in Senate Bill 800 cases
will likely focus almost exclusively on the interests of the parties.
259. Some authors argue that mediation is valuable to parties because the
neutral or other mediator helps them assess their case. This idea supports the
proposition that the parties might benefit from the opinion that they might receive in arbitration. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 249, at 266-67:
[M]ediation adds value to the disputing transaction by providing the
parties with information and structured evaluation that parties themselves cannot provide. This view ... suggests parties benefit significantly from being accorded a relatively timely, reasonably formal opportunity to present their case to a neutral third party and to receive a
fair and reflective hearing of the matter.., both economic and sociological analysis tends to suggest that more value is added to the process when the mediator not only gives the parties a forum and assists
them in new ways of assessing the dispute, but also provides some
yardstick for assessing the options...
Id. (citations omitted).
260. See generallyid.
261. The mediator could take a facilitative or evaluative approach, depending
on the attitude and needs of the parties. Hibberd & Newman describe the approach of the Construction Disputes Resolution Group, a British organization:
"The Construction Disputes Resolution Group (CDRG) mediation service sets
out in its guidelines that the mediator has the discretion to adopt any procedure
that suits the parties and may at any stage make proposals for the settlement of
the dispute. This provides a high degree of flexibility..." HIBBERD &
NEWMAN, supra note 258, at 61.
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sues, and interests,26 and California's statutory solutions that
address these complex problems should carefully consider the
many factors and interests involved in residential construction defect claims. 2' Homeowners and builders need a construction defect resolution system that works to minimize
litigation, and also encourages builders to provide a better
product for the homeowner."
The prelitigation provisions
California Civil Code sections 1375 and 875 through 945.5
strive to limit litigation by encouraging settlement before
homeowners' associations file formal complaints. However,
the settlement incentives in both statutes may not provide a
dispute resolution system that is effective enough to overcome
homeowners' desires to test claims in court.265
Because the statutes focus on resolving defects prior to
formal litigation, the parties' satisfaction with the resolution
they reach at that stage is critical in fulfilling the goals of the
statutes. If the parties are more satisfied with the prelitigation solution, they will be less likely to feel the need for litigation. Ultimately, the goals of any resolution system for residential construction defect claims should include encouraging
better workmanship; indeed, "[g]ood construction and design
have always been the best defenses."2' A home without defects is a happy and litigation-free home.

262. See discussion supra at Part II.C.
263. Id.
264. Although the legislative focus on construction defects is the abundance
of litigation, poor construction is the root of this litigation. Consequently, use of
legislation to solve defect problems should include measures to resolve current
problems as well as discourage future problems. See infraPart III.
265. See discussion supra Part IV.
266. Cameron, supra note 223, at 7.

